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bias when moderators focus on these signals but overlook misbehavior by others. We propose that algorithmic
agging systems deployed to improve eciency of moderation work can also make moderation actions more
fair to these users by reducing reliance on social signals and making norm violations by everyone else more
visible. We analyze moderator behavior in Wikipedia as mediated by a system called RCFilters that displays
social signals and algorithmic ags and to estimate the causal eect of being agged on moderator actions.
We show that algorithmically agged edits are reverted more oen, especially edits by established editors
with positive social signals, and that agging decreases the likelihood that moderation actions will be undone.
Our results suggest that algorithmic agging systems can lead to increased fairness but that the relationship
is complex and contingent.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online community moderators are responsible for reviewing torrents of user generated content for
spam, vandalism, aacks, and other violations of community norms and rules. In many large online
communities, a small number of moderators—oen volunteers—will be responsible for reviewing
thousands or millions of actions and taking steps to stop and mitigate problematic behavior [24].
To help focus their aention within this deluge, moderators typically rely on social signals [19] that
indicate that a user’s contributions are made in good faith and of high quality [46]. Common signals
include visible reputation, experience, and registration status [9, 46]. For example, because new
users are oen more likely to engage in bad behavior, moderators might scrutinize contributions
from newcomers more closely [46, 64]. However, directing limited moderation aention based on
social signals can introduce unfairness through “over-proling” that occurs when moderators focus
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their aention on users with signals associated with bad behavior while ignoring others engaged
in similar or worse behavior [18]. For this reason, and because relying on social signals can still
place enormous demands on limited moderator resources, online communities are increasingly
adopting algorithmic agging systems to direct moderators toward problematic actions [13, 27].
Although the consequences are very dierent, these systems share salient commonalities with
algorithmic agging systems used in employment, college admissions, and criminal justice. All
of these systems use predictions of whether an outcome will occur to ag certain individuals as
more or less likely sources of problems and leave nal decisions to a human judge. e use of
these systems when people’s lives are at stake has rightfully aracted critique on the basis of how
algorithms engage in misrepresentation and discrimination [4, 11, 61].
On the other hand, advocates of algorithmic prediction in criminal justice argue that algorithms—
even those that are measurably biased in their outcomes—might still be less discriminatory than
decisions made by biased human judges alone [44, 72].
Can algorithmic agging systems reduce reliance on social signals and lead to more fair outcomes?
We seek to answer this question through a eld evaluation of an algorithmic agging system called
RCFilters that was deployed on 23 dierent Wikipedia language editions from January 2019 to
March 2020. RCFilters ags contributions identied as likely to be damaging by the ORES machine
learning system [27]. ese ags are shown alongside existing social signals of quality. We take
advantage of a set of arbitrary thresholds built into RCFilters to conduct a quasi-experimental
analysis that estimates the causal eect of algorithmic agging on moderation decisions and that
seeks to measure whether algorithmic ags lead to beer or worse outcomes for users who are
likely to be over-scrutinized ex ante. Our results suggest that algorithmic agging can lead to more
fair outcomes but that this eect may depend on specics of the social signals in question.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, our work answers calls to analyze the impacts of
algorithms in situ [69, 72, 79] by oering an empirical evaluation of an algorithmic agging system
in an important social computing context. Second, our analysis contributes to an ongoing debate
over when and how algorithms might lead to more or less fair outcomes for individuals subject
to proling by human decision makers. ird, our work oers a methodological contribution
by presenting a novel quasi-experimental approach that can act as a template for future non-
interventionist studies of causal eects of algorithmic decision support systems. Finally, our work
contributes to social computing system design by suggesting improvements to algorithmic agging
and ltering systems.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Moderation in Online Communities
Contemporary online communities are ooded with harassment, spam, misinformation, disinfor-
mation, and hate. Users of social media systems frequently and agrantly violate community and
platforms rules, various laws, and norms of decency and decorum. Even users acting in good faith
can do damage by taking conversations o-topic, undermining the stated purpose of communities,
and lowering the quality of discourse or the knowledge goods being produced. Protecting online
communities from unwanted activity are content moderators—many of them volunteers—that
Gillespie [24] has described as “custodians of the Internet.” Moderation work typically involves
three tasks: reviewing content or activity, mitigating damage caused by problematic behavior, and
sanctioning users in various ways [24, 38, 41, 68].
Grimmelmann [25] denes moderation as “governance mechanisms that structure participation in
a community to facilitate cooperation and prevent abuse.” Discussions of content moderation oen
focus on individuals occupying formal roles as moderators with special rights and responsibilities.
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For example, many of the moderators in Gillespie’s [24] account are professional moderators
working for major platforms like like Facebook and Twier. Many moderators, and nearly all in
platforms like Reddit and Discord [38, 41, 54], work as volunteers but occupy similar positions of
formal authority and responsibility. at said, the work of moderation is oen distributed across
regular community members [42, 50]. In Wikipedia, for example, the bulk of moderation activity
as dened by Grimmelmann occurs as normal users review, vet, and undo the work of others to
mitigate damage and sanction users they believe have behaved badly [63].
2.1.1 Sanctions. Sanctioning involves enforcing norms in ways that aempt to discourage future
non-normative misbehavior. It is a core part of moderation work because it encourages compliance
with norms by communicating that rules will be enforced [36, 71]. Although it also serves to
mitigate damage, removing content is a common form of sanctioning because it communicates that
an action was inappropriate [63]. Halfaker et al. [29] shows that removing content is an eective
sanction and results in higher quality subsequent contributions by the reverted contributor in
Wikipedia. Similarly, Srinivasan et al. [71] found that people whose comments were removed from
Reddit were less likely to violate norms in the future.
Although the goal of most sanctioning is to steer participants toward more productive types of
behavior, the eect is oen simply to deter participation. is can be particularly problematic with
well-meaning newcomers who oen violate norms because they have not yet learned the ropes
[1, 26, 29].
Sanctioned newcomers are less likely to continue participating, especially in the absence of clear
explanations from moderators [26, 36, 43, 64, 73]. On Wikipedia and similar communities, high
rates of sanctioning can help explain declines in participation and may be an obstacle to building a
community that includes diverse participants [26, 48, 73].
2.1.2 Meta-norms. No moderation system is perfect, and moderators inevitably make mistakes
and apply sanctions in ways that are arbitrary and unfair. is is particularly dicult to avoid
in distributed moderation models used on sites like Slashdot or Wikipedia where moderation
carried out by large and diverse groups of untrained and loosely coordinated users. Sanctions can
be particularly demotivating to newcomers when contributors feel that sanctions are unfair and
incorrect [24, 36, 71]. As a result, steps that make sanctions more fair might ameliorate the negative
eects of moderator sanctions on community growth.
One way to improve fairness and accountability in moderation is through governance structures
that enforce accountability [20]. Toward this end, Slashdot famously created tools for “meta-
moderation” that allowed all users to evaluate the decisions of moderators [50]. Users whose
moderation decisions were controversial or at odds with the opinions of other Slashdot members
would be not given moderation privileges again. Although formal systems for meta-moderation
remain rare, there exist many common behaviors that serve a similar social function by taking action
against controversial sanctions [16]. Of particular relevance are “meta-norms” which prescribe
when and how one should issue sanctions against violations of rst-order norms [33]. Reagle
[65] documents the formalization of meta-norms on Wikipedia and Piskorski and Gorbataˆi [63]
show how Wikipedia users engage in meta-norm maintenance by undoing sanctions in ways that
eectively sanction the originally sanctioning user.
2.1.3 Flagging and Algorithmic Triage. Moderators can face incredible challenges in scaling
their work to handle what can become an enormous mass of content and user activity in large
online communities [24, 41, 67, 68]. In interviews conducted by Kiene et al. [41], small teams of
volunteer moderators tasked with maintaining order in large communities described their work
managing tends of thousands of users engaging simultaneously as akin to “running a small city.”
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Some platforms deal with scale by employing more paid moderators. However, the work involved
can be exploitative, dicult, traumatizing, and expensive [66]. Volunteer moderator teams may
also aempt to recruit additional volunteers to deal with growth but frequently nd it dicult to
identify, train, and integrate new members [42]. On average, volunteer leadership teams become
less likely to add new members as their communities grow [70].
For these reasons and others, it is oen impossible for communities to scale moderation resources
such that human moderators can review all activity. As a result, many moderation systems
implement agging so a wider group of users can report content for review by moderators [25]. If
users reliably ag problematic behavior, agging can mitigate issues of scale because moderators
can use ags to focus their aention on behavior that is likely problematic. Of course, agging
is far from a perfect solution. From the perspective of a agged user, agging can seem arbitrary
and opaque [16]. From a moderator perspective, agging is awed because disgruntled users can
coordinate to use agging systems to overwhelm moderators and target opposing viewpoints [16].
Finally, in that traditional agging systems continue to rely on volunteer labor, they oen fail to
fully address issues of scale leaving many bad actions unagged, unreviewed, and unsanctioned.
To address this nal limitation, communities have turned to algorithmic agging systems that
use computer programs to automatically mark content for review by human moderators [40, 41, 67].
Although some of these systems rely on keywords, regular expressions, or heuristics, the more
advanced and exible versions of these systems use predictions from machine learning models.
ese systems are seen as promising answers to the problem of moderation at scale because they
can easily be used to review an enormous volume of behavior, they may be less vulnerable to
strategic agging, and they may be more reliable than human reviewers.
Algorithmic agging systems can be thought of as human-in-the-loop versions of similar com-
putational systems that engage in full automating moderation activity. For example, many digital
platforms use the PhotoDNA system to automatically identify and remove child pornography [24].
Similarly, Wikipedia’s ClueBot NG uses a machine learning predictor to automatically remove van-
dalism [22]. Although they play a critical role in reducing moderation workloads, fully automated
systems are uncertain enough in most of their assessments that they are typically only considered
useful in defending against the most clear-cut examples of misbehavior [24].
Some machine learning systems designed to classify bad behavior are used as a form of algorithmic
triage. e most egregious examples of bad behavior might be dealt with automatically by an
automatic systems while many other possible or likely norm-violations are agged for review
and action by human moderators. For example, Reddit allows moderators to dene a system of
rules based on regular expressions to automatically remove or ag content for further review [37].
Algorithmic agging systems based on machine learning occupy the vanguard of online activity
regulation and numerous examples have been described in recent scholarship. Chandrasekharan
et al. [13] describes a system for Reddit communities to share information and collaborate on
automatic agging that accounts for dierences between rules of dierent communities. Wulczyn
et al. [77] presents a system for classifying harassing behavior on Wikipedia. Finally, Halfaker
et al. [27] developed the Objective Revision Evaluation Service (ORES) system to predict quality of
contributions and content on Wikipedia.
2.2 Will algorithmic flagging decrease discrimination of over-profiled users?
One of the most important debates in contemporary technology policy is the degree to which the
introduction of algorithms into socially consequential decision-making leads to more or less fair
outcomes [14, 44, 61, 69]. Much of this debate focuses on arguments about whether algorithms
will amplify or entrench discrimination. Discrimination is deferential treatment of individuals
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based on membership in a group. Economists of discrimination distinguish between taste-based
and statistical discrimination [6, 7, 62]. Taste-based discrimination is driven by preferences for
members of one group and includes both ideologically-driven racism and implicit bias. Statistical
discrimination occurs when social signals—visible and socially salient characteristics, such as group
memberships—are instrumental in driving decisions. Statistical discrimination can also lead to
unequal outcomes for certain groups.
Although most discussion of statistical discrimination focus on high-stakes contexts like banking,
labor markets, and criminal justice, moderation in online communities is also ripe for statistical
discrimination. For example, Wikipedia’s Missing Manual advises would-be vandal ghters on
Wikipedia to “consider the source” when “estimating the likelihood that an edit is vandalism” [9].
Because newcomers are more likely to violate rules, moderators may rely on social signals associated
with being new to nd bad behavior or to decide if an ambiguous contribution was made in bad
faith. Social signals of newness in online communities include formal reputation systems like karma
on Reddit and Slashdot, badges on StackExchange, or many other more subtle signals [25, 49, 57]
In any case, increased scrutiny and skepticism can translate into an an increased likelihood of
sanction, simply for being new. Statistical discrimination emerges because moderators are more
likely to scrutinize and sanction new contributors who have legitimate reasons for contributing.
Ethical philosophers have objected to the way social signals are used in online moderation
activity. Dutch philosopher Paul de Laat adopts the concept of “proling” from legal scholar
Frederick Schauer to argue against the use—and even the public display of—social signals like
registration status and experience levels in the user interfaces used for moderation. de Laat objects
to the display of these signals because they are prone to “over-use” [17, 18]. It is important to
note that discriminating by aributes like newness does not raise the same legal or constitutional
concerns as discrimination against protected classes such as race or religion. Online communities
establish their own norms and may choose to protect or target certain aributes based on a specic
community’s values. For example, while discussing Wikipedia, de Laat argues that this type of
“over-use” is unethical, immoral and inconsistent with the community’s founding principles of
transparency and equality. Drawing on de Laat, we refer to individuals with social signals that
elicit undue scrutiny as “over-proled.”
Although an important debate continues over the use of algorithmic predictions in domains
like criminal sentencing, proponents of algorithms argue that they could reduce discrimination
and inequality [44, 72]. Algorithms can reproduce statistical discrimination, but they might be
less biased than the alternative: human decisions that would presumably rely heavily, if perhaps
subconsciously, on salient social signals like race. Critics suggest that algorithms simply obscure this
discrimination behind complex mathematical models that are dicult to understand, interrogate,
or challenge.
Although this debate is dicult to resolve in the case of criminal justice, algorithmic agging in
online community moderation provides a seing with lower stakes and more detailed data. Although
the social signals and contexts are substantially dierent, similar social and psychological processes
may be in play. If we apply arguments proposing that algorithms can reduce discrimination to
community moderation, we would conclude that algorithmic triage systems would reduce the
impact of discrimination among over-proled individuals by making misbehavior by all kinds of
users visible to community moderators. If algorithmic agging reduces over-proling bias then it
will have a smaller eect on over-proled users than on others. If algorithms simply reproduce
discrimination, we would nd no such dierence.
is leads us to our rst research question: [RQ1]Howwill agging an action change the likelihood
an action is sanctioned for over-proled editors compared to others?
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2.3 Will algorithmic flagging increase fairness?
A system might discriminate by sanctioning one group more than others but still be justiable
if all sanctions were fair. But what does it means for sanctioning to be fair? e subject of
fairness in algorithmic systems is a major subject of debate in computing and AI. ere are many
dierent approaches to conceptualizing fairness and no algorithmic predictor can satisfy them all
[4, 12, 45, 58, 75, 78].
While such approaches focus on discrimination built into machine learning programs, we seek a
concept of fairness that reects the standards of relevant communities of practice. We nd one in
the concept of “meta-norms” from social psychology and James Coleman’s sociological conception
of norm maintenance. Drawing from these sources, we dene unfair sanctions as those that a
community is unwilling to let stand—i.e., sanctions that are themselves the subject of sanction
[15, 33, 63]. For example, a norm in Wikipedia governs right and wrong ways of editing wiki
pages. Sanctions of rst-order norm violations are governed by meta-norms about what sorts of
contributions merit sanction. Following Piskorski and Gorbataˆi [63], we describe a sanction as
controversial—i.e., in likely violation of a meta-norm—if it in turn is sanctioned by a third community
member. Relying on this denition of fairness, our second research question asks how algorithmic
agging shapes the fairness of sanctioning in terms of such sanctions for meta-norm violations:
[RQ2] How will agging an action change the chances it receives a controversial sanction?
Inuential theoretical frameworks in social computing seem to predict competing answers to this
second question. First, dual process models of behavioral economics suggest that people will tend
to rely on “salient signals” for rapid decision making in conditions of uncertainty and imperfect
information [8, 44, 74]. When human moderators choose behavior to review or sanction using
using social signals associated with over-proled users these aributes serve as salient signals but
remain far from perfect signals of quality. Algorithmic ags provide an additional salient signal
but are also far from perfect [27]. Indeed, algorithmic agging systems are typically designed
to minimize the risk of missing bad behavior by surfacing large numbers of false positives (i.e.,
non-problematic behavior) and relying on human moderators to make nal decisions. Of course, if
human moderators use algorithmic ags as salient signals, they may reproduce algorithms’ false
predictions. In this case, controversial sanctions will increase.
A second perspective suggests that algorithmic ags can increase fairness. Many online com-
munities have formalized rules, norms, and meta-norms and act as highly institutionalized and
rationalized organizations [10, 63, 76]. Kreiss et al. [47] argue that increasing formalization and
rationalization in online communities can lead to more fair outcomes. rough this lens, an al-
gorithmic agging system can reect a shi away from idiosyncratic individual decision-making
and toward standardization, rationalization, and governance that is more in-line with community
meta-norms. In this way, an algorithmic tool can be a “carrier of formal rationality” [52] that can
decrease the volume of controversial sanctions.
Finally, we seek to combine our two previous research questions to ask whether algorithmic
agging systems will be more or less fair in their eects on the sanctioning of over-proled users
relative to others. We ask: [RQ3]Within the set of sanctioned actions, how will the eect of agging
an action on controversial sanctions depend on whether contributors are over-proled?
Once again, inuential theoretical frameworks in social computing research seem to point in
opposite directions. Under dual-process psychological models, both social signals and algorithmic
ags might kinds of signals might cue moderators to issue sanctions and might substitute for one
another. In this case, we would hypothesize that agging would have a more positive eect on
controversial sanctions among under-proled contributors, who had previously been relatively
ignored, than it does among the over-proled individuals, who were always scrutinized. On
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ORES Flags User prole link Unregistered editor
Fig. 1. Screenshot of Wikipedia edit metadata on Special:RecentChanges with RCFilters enabled. Highlighted
edits with a colored circle to the le side of other metadata are flagged by ORES. Dierent circle and highlight
colors (white, yellow, orange, and red in the figure) correspond to dierent levels of confidence that the edit is
damaging. Users can configure which colors are shown. Visible social signals include registration status (i.e.
whether a user name or an IP address is shown) and whether an editor’s user page and user talk page exist.
RCFilters does not specifically flag edits by new accounts, but does support filtering changes by newcomers.
the other hand, if the larger eect of algorithmic agging is helping moderators comply with
meta-norms, it simply will not maer whether contributors are over-proled.
3 EMPIRICAL SETTING
We seek to answer our three research questions through a eld evaluation of an algorithmic agging
system called RCFilters that was deployed on 23 dierent Wikipedia language editions between
January 2019 and March 2020. RCFilters stands for “Recent Changes lters.” e term “Recent
Changes” refers to a page on Wikipedia that allows viewers to see the the most recent changes
made to the site.1 As shown in Figure 1, RCFilters adds a set of ags represented as colored dots on
the le side of the list of recent contributions. Social signals are also visible including registration
status and whether a user has created a prole page. Although dense with information about recent
edits and hyperlinks, the page is immediately understandable to Wikipedia moderators. When
deployed, the RCFilters interface appears both on “Recent Changes” as well as on “watchlists”—a
special version of “Recent Changes” that shows only edits to the subset of pages that a user has
elected to follow. RCFilters must be enabled by each user on their Wikipedia user preferences page.
Algorithmic agging in the RCFilters system is powered by the ORES edit quality models trained
to predict whether edits are labeled “damaging” or “not damaging.” e models are gradient boosted
decision trees trained on a mixture of human labeled Wikipedia edits and edits made by established
editors that are assumed to be “not damaging.” It is important to note that ORES models do not
merely reproduce proling paerns typical of moderation on Wikipedia. e interface for labeling
training data obscures social signals from the volunteer Wikipedians doing labeling work and
its models are predictive of damage from users that are not anonymous or newcomers. More
information on the design and implementation of ORES can be found in Halfaker et al. [27].
4 METHODS
Our analysis is based around a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that seeks to estimate causal
eects of agging by RCFilters on moderator behavior in Wikipedia [34, 35, 51]. Common in
empirical economics, RDDs are quasi-experimental in that they resemble a randomized control
trial for data points in the neighborhood of an arbitrary cuto [35, 51]. RDDs model how an
outcome depends on this cuto and a continuous “forcing variable.” e idea behind an RDD
1For example, the Recent Changes page for English Wikipedia is available here: hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:
RecentChanges
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is that observations immediately below and above the cuto will be equal in expectation aer
adjusting for any underlying (i.e., “secular”) trend. For example, RDDs used in econometrics might
estimate the eect of passing a test by comparing the outcomes of people who barely passed and
failed. One benet of an RDD over a eld experiments based on A/B tests is that it can provide
ecological validity and support causal claims without subjecting users to intervention without
consent [5, 39]. Although they are still rare in social computing research, RDDs have been used in
recent publications in social computing [32, 60].
Our forcing variable is scores from the ORES machine learning system and our cut-o variables
are a set of arbitrarily chosen operating points used by RCFilters. Our outcomes are constructed by
creating two variables that indicate whether a revision’s author is over-proled as well as variables
that indicates whether each revision was reverted or subject to a controversial revert. We discuss
each in turn before introducing our analytic approach.
4.1 Data and Measures
We build our dataset from two publicly available tables of Wikimedia history published by the
Wikimedia Foundation (WMF).2 Although Wikipedia is published and collaborated on in many
languages, the vast majority of knowledge about collaboration on Wikipedia is derived from studies
of English Wikipedia [30, 31]. To support generalizability, we analyze data from 23 language
editions of Wikipedia where edit quality ags are displayed in the RCFilters interface. To ensure
that we have variation in our outcomes, we exclude wikis with less than 3 edits above and below
each threshold (see 4.1.1) from each sub-analysis. For all of our analyses, our unit of analysis is
the revision. Revisions correspond to a single edit to a page by a participant on Wikipedia. Since
we care about how algorithmic agging and social signals are used by human moderators, we
exclude revisions by bots. Following guidance for RDDs [51], we include only revisions very near
to RCFilters thresholds, with ORES scores within 0.03 of the thresholds.
To manage the total size of our dataset, we analyze a sample that we construct by stratifying
along a number of dimensions: Wikipedia language edition; user registration status (4.1.4); whether
the editor has a user page or not (4.1.4); whether an edit was reverted in 2 hours, 48 hours, or 30
days; whether the edit was agged by RCFilters (4.1.1); and whether the revert was controversial
(4.1.3). We then sample 5000 edits from within unique combinations of the variables. If there are
less than 5000 edits in a given strata, we include all of them. We adjust for this stratication using
sample weights throughout our analysis. Because RCFilters was introduced to dierent wikis at
dierent times, we sample edits during the period immediately following the introduction of ORES
but weight our sample according to the number of edits to each wiki over the entire study period.
e number of observations sampled at each threshold and from each Wiki for each model are
available in the supplementary material.
4.1.1 ORES scores and RCfilter thresholds. e continuous forcing variable used in our RDD
analysis is a score from the ORES algorithm described in 3. Scores range from 0 to 1 and reect
the predicted probability that a revision is damaging. Because the ORES system has been under
continual development over time, we obtain ORES scores created at the times revisions were made
from a log maintained by the WMF. e treatments in our analysis are whether edits to Wikipedia
are agged by RCFilters. ese ags are applied if, and only if, a score from ORES exceeds a
threshold. is use of thresholds at arbitrary operating points is a feature of most algorithmic
agging systems. e intuition behind our RDD is that—aer adjusting for small dierences in
quality associated with marginally higher or lower scores—edits with ORES scores immediately
2hps://wikitech.wikimedia.org/wiki/Analytics/Data Lake/Edits/Mediawiki history; hps://dumps.wikimedia.org/other/
mediawiki history/readme.html
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2020.
The eects of algorithmic flagging on fairness 1:9
above and below an arbitrary threshold will be similarly likely to receive both rst-order and
controversial sanctions. As a result, any discontinuous change in reverts at a one of the threshold’s
used by RCFilters can be aributed to the ag.
RCFilters uses multiple thresholds corresponding to green, yellow, orange, and red ags. By
default only orange and red ags are shown, but users can congure which colors to display. Green
ags and lters are to help Wikipedia editors nd good edits. Our analysis considers only red,
orange, and yellow ags which correspond to thresholds making dierent trade-os between
precision (the proportion of agged edits that are truly damaging) and recall (the proportion of
truly damaging edits that are agged). e red ag is labeled “very likely damaging and corresponds
to a high precision threshold. Orange ags corresponds to a “likely damaging” label with greater
recall but less precision. Edits with a yellow ag are “maybe damaging” with a high recall but
lower precision. RCFilters’s thresholds are truly arbitrary and have changed over time and across
language editions in response to shis in the precision and recall of ORES models and in response
to community feedback. We were able to collect data on thresholds over time, fully trained ORES
models, code to run the models on our servers, and the precise time that changes are deployed in
the WMF server admin log. We combined these data to identify the thresholds that were active for
each revision in our dataset.
4.1.2 Sanctions. Our outcome variable for answering RQ1 must capture sanctioning in Wikipedia.
Following a large body of other social computing research, we measure sanctions as identity reverts
[e.g., 26, 29, 63, 73]. Identity reverts occur when a user undoes another user’s edit by restoring a
page to an earlier state and are measured by comparing hashes of page revisions [29]. at said,
identity reverts are an imperfect measure of sanctioning. A type of vandalism called “blanking”
removes all content on a page and therefore might be measured as identity reverting all prior edits
to the page. It is also possible for an individual to “self-revert” by undoing their own edit. To help
mitigate these issues, we only label revisions as reverted if they were undone within 48 hours and
were not undone by self-reverts. We label revisions as not reverted otherwise.
4.1.3 Controversial sanctions. Our outcome variable for answering RQ2 and RQ3 measures
controversial sanctions. We follow Piskorski and Gorbataˆi [63] by measuring controversial sanctions
as identity reverts that are subsequently reverted by a third party. Specically, we label a sanction
as controversial if the sanction is undone by a third editor who was not the original editor or the
reverting editor. Such interactions likely correspond to cases in which a third party observes the
initial revert, disagrees with the initial sanction, and then acts to reverse the sanction.
4.1.4 Social signals. Answering our RQ1 and RQ3 requires that we identify under- and over-
proled individuals in our empirical seing. Drawing from research and documentation for
Wikipedia moderators, we identify two such measures shown in the RCFilters interface shown
in Figure 1. Our rst measures is whether an editor was logged into an account. Unregistered
editors act on Wikipedia without logging in and Registered contributors are those that edit with
accounts. Because they are identied by their IP address rather a chosen username, unregistered
editors are also referred to as “IP editors” or “anons.” Unregistered editors are associated with
misbehavior and have long had a controversial status on Wikipedia [56]. Geiger and Ribes describe
how tools for moderators highlight unregistered editors [23]. de Laat argues that unregistered
users on Wikipedia are over-proled in that they are at higher risk to have their contributions
rejected unfairly [17, 18].
Second, the RCFilters interface indicates whether the editor has created a User page. User pages
are Wikipedia’s version of prole pages. Not having a User page is a strong social signal of newness
because most commied users will create a User page early into their experience in Wikipedia
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[3]. e presence or absence of pages in Wikipedia is indicated with a subtle user interface clue:
links to pages that do not exist are rendered in red while links to pages that exist are blue. For
example, Figure 1 shows the user “Mashlova” whose name is shown in red and would be identied
as a newcomer. de Laat cites the absence of a User page as a second example of an indicator of
vandalism that will result in over-proling [18]. We measure whether a user’s User page exists at
the time of a given contribution by matching the titles of User pages against the editor’s user name
and checking if the creation of the User page was prior to the edit in question.
5 ANALYTIC PLAN
Our analysis consists of 9 Bayesian logistic regression models in two parallel analyses. e rst
analysis treats our dichotomous measure of whether edits are reverted as an outcome. is begins
with an “adoption check” (6) that describes the causal eects of agging on reverts in general. e
adoption check is prerequisite to answering our research questions. e rest of the rst analysis
(7.1) answers RQ1 by comparing the eect of RCFilters on edits by over-proled users to its eect
on other editors. Our second analysis is very similar but uses controversial reverts as the outcome,
and analyzes only reverted edits to model the probability a revert is controversial. It begins by
answering RQ2 (7.2) in an analysis similar to the adoption check but with controversial sanctions
as an outcome and with a dataset limited to over-proled users. e rest of the second analysis (7.2)
answers RQ3 and is similar to RQ1 but with controversial reverts as the outcome in place of reverts.
Following Litschig and Morrison [53]’s use of RDD models with multiple discontinuities, our
models incorporate all three RCFilters thresholds. Our goal is to estimate τj which is the causal
eect of being agged at level j, where j ∈ {1, 2, 3} corresponding to labels of “maybe damaging”,
“likely damaging” and “very likely damaging.” For each cuto on each wiki, we select revisions
whose ORES scores is within a +/−0.03 window of the cuto. Following established approaches to
RDD, we t “kink” models that allow for a change in slope at the discontinuity [51, 53].
We use Bayesian inference to estimate our models for two reasons. First, virtually all edits above
the “very damaging” level are reverted in some of the wikis we analyze. e presence of near-perfect
“separation” creates estimation problems for classical numerical approaches [2]. Preferred solutions
to this problem in non-Bayesian frameworks include penalized likelihood methods that introduce
bias. Our Bayesian approach uses weakly-informative priors that are conservative but avoid the
problem of separation as a result. e second reason we use Bayesian inference is that it makes it
easy to compare estimates across models. Prior work at CSCW by Gan et al. [21] uses a similar
rationale for adopting Bayesian logistic regression. In Bayesian analysis, ed models take the form
of posterior distributions constituting a probability distribution of model coecients conditional on
our model, data, and priors. We consider a hypothesis supported if it is consistent with at least 95%
of posterior draws. In other words, we accept a given hypothesis if our parameter estimate has the
predicted sign and the 95% credible interval does not contain zero. is is the Bayesian analog to
testing a hypothesis with α = 0.05. We t our models using the rstanarm package (version 2.19.3)
and the default priors which are provided for reference in the supplementary material.
6 ADOPTION CHECK
Before presenting results from hypothesis tests associated with our research questions, we rst
establish that RCFilters was adopted by Wikipedia moderators and that it had an eect on sanc-
tioning behavior. is establishes a baseline necessary to answer RQ1 about the dierential eects
of RCFilters between and over-proled users and others. is is important because null eects
in RQ1 might simply reect that the system was not used. A successful adoption check rules out
this possibility and sets up a credible null hypothesis test for RQ1. To demonstrate that RCFilters
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Fig. 2. Marginal eects plot showing model predicted relationship between ORES score and the probability
that an edit will be reverted around the cutos for all contributors with 95% credible intervals
ags are being used by Wikipedia moderators, we test the hypothesis that agging increases the
probability that an edit is reverted. If Wikipedia moderators are using ags in RCFilters to review
potentially damaging edits, our estimates for τj —as described in 5—should be positive.
We nd strong evidence that RCFilters was adopted and impacted sanctioning. is evidence
is visualized in Figure 2, a marginal eects plot that visualizes our models’ predicted likelihood
of reverts across dierent ORES scores in the neighborhood of the thresholds. In each such plot,
the x-axis shows the distance from the threshold such that discontinuities at 0 represent the eect
of being agged. e plots show modeled values for the English language edition of Wikipedia
but are representative of relationships across all wikis.3 Figure 2 shows discontinuous increases in
the likelihood of reversion at the “maybe damaging”, and “likely damaging” thresholds in the le
and center panels. We nd the greatest eect at the “maybe damaging” threshold (τ1 = 1.23 [1.19;
1.28]).4 We do not see a discontinuous increase at the “very likely damaging” threshold shown in
the right-most panel (τ3 = −0.01, [−0.1; 0.09]).
e impacts of the “maybe damaging” and “likely damaging” ags on the likelihood of sanctioning
are enormous. Figure 2 shows that likelihood of a revert for an edit just below the “maybe damaging”
threshold is between 5.5% and 5.8% indicating that reverts of unagged edits are relatively rare.
Being agged with the “maybe damaging” ag causes a dramatic increase in the reversion probability
to between 16.8% and 17.7% for edits just above the threshold. e eect of algorithmic ags at the
“likely damaging” level is even more stark. We estimate that edits just below the “likely damaging”
threshold are likely to be reverted between 24.3% and 25.8% of the time while otherwise similar
edits just above the threshold are reverted between 46.1% and 48.7% of the time.
We believe that we do not observe any increase in the likelihood of sanctioning at the “very
likely damaging” level because actions agged as “very likely damaging” are also agged as “likely
damaging” in the RCFilters’ default conguration. As a result, the marginal impact of being agged
as “very likely damaging” on visibility is likely very small. Moreover, edits agged as “very likely
damaging” are oen so egregious that they will be reverted by bots before a human moderator can
review them.
3Because intercepts are the only part of our model that depend on Wikis, slopes and the discontinuities caused by algorithmic
agging represent our inference over all our data.
4All τ parameter estimates are reported as log-odds ratios. e bracket notation indicates the 95% credible interval. In other
words, the most likely value of the parameter is 1.23, but there is a 95% probability that the parameter lies in the interval
[1.19; 1.28].
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Fig. 3. Results for RQ1 showing point estimates and credible intervals for dierences in the causal eect of
flagging on sanctioning between over-profiled contributors and others. A value greater than 0 indicates that
our estimates of the eect for under-profiled contributors is greater than that for over-profiled contributors.
7 RESULTS
7.1 RQ1: Eect of flagging on sanctioning
Our rst research question (RQ1), seeks to understand how the increase in sanctioning caused by
agging aects discrimination against over-proled users. If algorithmic agging reduces over-
proling, as some computer scientists have argued [44], the eect of agging will be more scrutiny
on users who are more likely to be given a pass. If algorithms simply reproduce discrimination, we
will nd no dierence. Results for hypothesis tests answering this question are shown in Figure 3
which visualizes the point estimates and credible intervals for dierences in the causal eects of
agging on reverts between unregistered and registered contributors and between contributors
with and without User pages. Values greater than 0 indicate that our estimated eect for the other
users is greater than that for the over-proled group.
In support of the idea that algorithmic agging can reduce over-proling bias, we nd that the
eect of agging on reverts of registered editors is greater than the eect for unregistered editors
at the “maybe damaging” threshold (τUnreg1 − τ Reg1 = 0.8 [0.71; 0.89]) and at the “likely damaging”
threshold (τUnreg2 − τ Reg2 = 0.78 [0.58; 0.97]). For an action by an unregistered contributor near to
the “maybe damaging” threshold, being agged increases the odds of being reverted by a factor
of between 1.45 and 1.6 times. is is signicantly greater than the increase of 3.16 and 3.68 for
registered contributors.
Figure 4 lets us interpret our models in terms of the probability of revert for actions on English
Wikipedia. ese plots make it possible to visually compare the eects of being agged between
over-proled and under-proled editors at a given threshold because they-axes in each row span an
identical range. e top-le panel shows how our models’ linear predictions of how the probability
of sanctioning for unregistered contributors at the “maybe damaging” threshold jumps between
4.8 and 6.7 percentage points, from 13.5% to 19.2% on average. For registered editors, shown in
the top-right of Figure 4, we estimate a jump of between 9.1 and 10.3 percentage points, from
4.6% to 14.3% on average. is is between 3.3 and 4.6 percentage points greater than the jump for
unregistered editors. For unagged edits that ORES scores near the “maybe damaging” threshold,
an unagged unregistered contributor has about the same odds of being sanctioned as a agged
registered contributor.
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e boom row of Figure 4 shows that the change in sanctioning probability at the “likely
damaging” threshold is between 9.5 and 15.2 percentage points greater for registered editors than
for unregistered editors. For unregistered contributors, shown in the boom-le of Figure 4, being
agged as “likely damaging” increases the probability of reverting between 15 and 18.6 percentage
points, from 33.5% to 50.2% on average. But for registered editors, shown in the boom-right of
Figure 4, we detect an even bigger jump of between 23.7 and 34.6 percentage points, from 15.5% to
44.5% on average. For actions that ORES scores near the “likely damaging” threshold, unagged
actions by unregistered editors are far more likely to be reverted. Once agged, actions by registered
and unregistered editors are reverted at relatively similar rates.
ese results provide strong evidence of agging leveling the playing eld between registered
and unregistered contributors. Our results suggest that actions by unregistered contributors that
fall just above the cutos are much more likely to be reverted due to RCFilters—but the gap between
actions by registered and unregistered contributors is much smaller when RCFilters has agged an
edit. In this way, our analysis suggests algorithmic agging can reduce over-proling bias.
Surprisingly, our results for our second measure of over-proling in Wikipedia suggest a dynamic
that is opposite in sign to the dierences we observe between registered and unregistered users
at the “maybe bad” threshold (τNoUP1 − τUP1 = −0.68 [−0.95;−0.41]). At the “likely bad” threshold
(τNoUP2 −τUP2 = −0.05 [−1.61; 1.39]) we do not detect a dierence in eect size between contributors
with and without User pages. At the “maybe damaging” threshold, we nd that agging increases
the odds that an editor without a User page is reverted between 3.47 and 4.06 times. is is
signicantly more than the increase of between 1.47 and 2.46 times for registered contributors.
As above, we interpret these odds ratios using marginal eects plots, this time shown in Figure 5.
e top-le plot in the gure shows our models’ linear predictions of the probability of reverting for
contributors without User pages near to the “maybe damaging” threshold. For these editors, being
agged as “maybe damaging” increases the chances of sanctioning by 11.4 and 13.8 percentage
points, from 5.6% to 18.1% on average. In the top-right of Figure 5, we see a jump of between 2.2
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Fig. 4. Results for RQ1 comparing unregistered and registered contributors are displayed in a marginal eects
plot showing model predicted relationship between ORES score and reverts around the thresholds that trigger
flags.
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and 4.8 percentage points, from 4% to 7.4% on average for editors that have created User pages. is
is between 9.7 and 8.4 percentage points less than the jump for contributors without User pages.
7.2 RQ2: Eect of flagging on controversial sanctioning
Consistent with the idea that algorithmic agging can support fairness, we nd that having an
ORES score cross the “maybe damaging” or “likely damaging” threshold decreases the chances that
a revert will be controversial for unregistered editors. ese results are visualized in Figure 7a. e
overall eect hides some variation between the magnitude of the eects across our two thresholds.
We have less condence in the eect at the “maybe damaging” threshold because our 95% credible
interval includes zero (τUnreg1 = −0.07; CI = [−0.16; 0.02]).
We estimate that being agged at the “maybe damaging” level results in change in the odds that a
sanction is controversial by a factor between 0.85 and 1.02. Figure 7b shows the modeled relationship
between ORES scores and the probability of a controversial sanction in the neighborhood of the
thresholds for English Wikipedia. On the le plot we see that being agged changes unregistered
contributor’s likelihood of a controversial revert from a possible increase of 0.38 percentage points
to a possible decrease of 0.69 percentage points, a change from 3.74% to 3.5% on average.
We have more condence in the eect at the “likely damaging” threshold (τUnreg2 = −0.09; CI =
[−0.16;−0.03]), where the odds that a revert is controversial are between 0.85 and 0.97 times smaller.
On the right side of 7b we that being agged decreases the probability that a sanction to an action
by an unregistered editor is controversial by between 0.01 and 0.55 percentage points, a change
from from 3.08% to 2.81% on average.
By summing our posteriors for both threshold parameters, we nd algorithmic agging has a
negative eect across both thresholds overall (τUnreg1 + τ
Unreg
2 = −0.16; CI = [−0.27;−0.05]).
However, we did not detect an eect of agging at the “maybe damaging” level when the
reverted editor lacks a User page (τNoUP1 = 0.01; CI = [−0.07; 0.08]) or at the “likely damaging”
level (τNoUP1 = −0.01; CI = [−0.15; 0.14]). We address the inconsistencies between our results for
unregistered editors and editors without User pages in our discussion (9).
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Fig. 5. Results for RQ1 comparing contributors with and without User pages. Each panel shows a marginal
eects plot of the modeled relationship between ORES score and reverts around the thresholds that trigger
flags.
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(a) Parameter estimates and 95% credible intervals for the eects of flagging on whether reverts are contro-
versial for unregistered editors.
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(b) Marginal eects plots for models predicting whether a revert is controversial, for unregistered editors.
Fig. 6. Results for RQ2: flagging causes a small but detectable decrease in the likelihood that an action by an
unregistered contributor receives a controversial sanction.
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(a) Parameter estimates and 95% credible intervals for eects of flagging on whether reverts are controversial
for editors without User pages.
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(b) Marginal eects plots for models predicting whether a revert is controversial, for contributors without
User pages.
Fig. 7. Results for RQ2 comparing contributors with User pages to those without show no detectable eect
of flagging on controversial sanctioning.
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Fig. 8. Results for RQ3 showing the dierence in our parameter estimates between over-profiled editors
and others. Lines show 95% credible intervals. Values greater than 0 would indicate that the eect for
under-profiled editors is greater than that for over-profiled editors.
7.3 RQ3: Social signals and eects of flagging on controversial sanctioning
In RQ3 we ask if changes in controversial sanctioning caused by agging depend on whether
users are over-proled. To answer this question, we largely replicate the analysis conducted for
RQ1 with the dependent variable used in RQ2. Results shown in Figure 8, provide weak evidence
that a decrease in controversial sanctioning at the “maybe damaging” threshold may be greater
for registered than for unregistered contributors (τ Reg1 − τUnreg1 = 0.04 [−0.06; 0.14]). e same
seems true at the “likely damaging” threshold (τNoUP2 − τUP2 = −0.07 [−0.05; 0.2]). However, our
evidence weakly suggests that the eect for contributors with user proles is greater than those
for without (τUP1 − τNoUP1 = 0.05 [−0.08; 0.17]), but the opposite seems true at the “likely damaging”
threshold (τUP2 −τNoUP2 = −0.26 [−0.79; 0.26]). None of these estimates nor their sums are statistically
signicant at the 95% level.
8 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Our results are subject to a range of threats to validity that pertain to our ability to make causal
claims, rule out alternative explanations, and establish the generalizability of our ndings. First,
there are several threats to our ability to draw causal inference that are common to RDDs. Formally,
RDDs model an outcome Y as a function of a continuous “forcing variable” Z , other covariates, and
a cuto c such that Z > c determines treatment assignment. In principle, treatment assignment
conditional on Z is “as good as random” under two assumptions: (1) that agents have at most
limited control over Z > c and (2) that the relationship between Y and Z is smooth [51]. While the
assumptions required for causal inference are fundamentally unveriable, we believe that our RDD
provides relatively strong evidence of causal relationships between agging and sanctioning.
Our treatment, being agged in RCFilters, is an ideal candidate for an RDD from the perspective
of assumption (1) because editors are unlikely to have much control over the scores that their edits
receive. While aempts to evade sanction by specially craing edits to evade algorithmic detection
are hypothetically possible, the authors of ORES and RCFilters believe they are unrealistic and
very unlikely to be wide-spread. Assumption (2) would be violated if any unobserved treatments
aect our outcomes at discrete levels of ORES scores. is is certainly possible because ORES
makes scores available via a public API. Indeed, we are aware of bots that automatically revert
edits triggered by the “very damaging” threshold on some of the Wikipedia language editions in
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our sample. To mitigate this threat, we exclude reverts by bots and at the “very likely damaging”
threshold. Although we identied one anti-vandalism tool—a system called Huggle discussed in
9—that collects ORES damaging scores, it uses ORES scores as one feature in its own algorithmic
model and by default presents predictions from this model to users as a list of edits sorted in order
of likelihood of vandalism. Given these facts, we believe it is unlikely that Huggle users will drive
discontinuities in the relationship between ORES scores and our outcomes.
Our study design is also limited in that we cannot present causal evidence of the impact of
social signals. Although RCFilters’s algorithmic ags are distributed in a quasi-experimental way,
over-proled status is not. ere are a range of possible systematic dierences between over-
proled users and others that might be driving our results for RQ1 and RQ3. For example, if
damaging edits by contributors who are unregistered or lack User pages are more dicult for ORES
to detect, that might drive our ndings of a decrease in over-proling for RQ1. Although we believe
that this particular threat is unlikely because it would require that over-proled contributors be
systematically more sophisticated than others—something our experience with ORES suggests is
unlikely—we cannot rule out either the specic threat or a range of other possibilities. A promising
direction for future work might involve experiments or quasi-experiments that are able to jointly
vary social signals and algorithmic agging.
Additionally, system designers will likely want to know how overall rates of sanctioning and
controversial sanctions change before and aer a system like RCFilters is launched. Our analysis
cannot answer this question directly. In preliminary work, we aempted to draw a statistical
comparison between Wikipedia governance before and aer the introduction of ORES scoring but
high temporal variation in sanctioning behaviors made this type of aggregate change dicult to
measure. Future studies should organize with communities to carry out planned and principled
eld experiments to study the causal eects of introducing such systems in online communities
using the model being pioneered by Matias and Mou [55].
Finally, a set of largely unanswerable threats involves questions of generalizability across our
measures and empirical contexts. While our theories of interactions between algorithmic ags
and social signals is general, and although we study RCFilters across 23 distinct communities and
cultures, we study a single moderator tool on one platform. We can not claim that our ndings
generalize beyond the specic pool of communities that we study. We can not claim that our seing
is representative of other Wikipedia communities that did not launch RCFilters. Clearly, we also
can not claim that our seings is representative of moderation in online communities in general.
Like most other empirical studies in social computing, we must sadly leave these questions for
further research.
9 DISCUSSION
In broadest strokes, our work provides excellent news for advocates of algorithmic agging in social
computing systems. Our work provides some evidence that supports the idea that algorithmic
agging can reduce discrimination in the form of over-proling bias and that it can increase fairness.
Our adoption check (6) provides strong evidence that RCFilters drives behavior and our answers to
RQ1 (7.1) suggests that agging seems to level the playing eld. Flagged actions by unregistered
and registered contributors are reverted at similar rates, but unagged edits of comparable quality
by registered editors are reverted relatively infrequently. More good news comes in the form of
our answer to RQ2 (7.2) that suggests that agging is associated with a decrease in controversial
sanctions among some over-proled users and provides evidence that algorithmic agging systems
can help moderators more accurately issue sanctions.
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When it comes the details however, the picture that emerges from our results is much more
contingent and mixed. Our analysis used two dierent measures of over-proling in Wikipedia but
the paern of our results diverged substantially between the two. e optimistic story about the
eects of algorithmic agging on over-proled users only describes our results for unregistered
Wikipedia users. Our evidence on over-proled users without User pages is much weaker and
points, in part, in the direction of algorithmic agging increasing discrimination. Why do these
results diverge? What do these divergent results mean for theory?
One possible explanation is that users without User pages are, quite simply, not particularly
over-proled. Of the two social signals we consider, registration status aracts far more aention
from academics and community members in discussions of Wikipedia vandalism [e.g., 32]. Our
analysis for RQ2, where we did not detect a change in controversial sanctions at the “maybe
damaging” threshold for editors without user pages, is consistent with the notion that contributors
without user pages may not be over-proled. However, this can not explain why the eect for
editors without prole pages was larger than for editors with them. It is plausible that our mixed
results are evidence that algorithmic ags will substitute for some social signals used in proling
while reinforcing others. A beer understanding of which signals drive sanctioning misbehavior
can help explain if and when algorithmic triage systems can increase fairness.
Our results suggest that algorithmic ags can substitute for social signals and reduce discrimina-
tion. Our results also suggest that they might also reinforce social signals and make discrimination
worse or introduce dnew forms of discrimination through encoded bias. For example, our result
might be explained if ORES is somehow biased against contributors without User pages such that
their agged edits are truly less damaging than agged edits by contributors who do have prole
pages. en agged edits by both kinds of users might be inspected by moderators at similar rates,
but sanctioned dierently. Unfortunately, outcomes resulting from myriad factors acting at once
are likely deeply contingent on details of sociotechnical arrangements and dicult to know ex ante.
Although RQ2 suggests that algorithmic agging can increase fairness for over-proled contrib-
utors, our null results for RQ3 mean that we could not detect a dierence in this eect between
over-proled editors and others. ese results are also puzzling. A null eect for RQ3 was sug-
gested by a theoretical framework proposing that cues or salient signals such as agging are less
important than meta-norms and useful information when it comes to controversial sanctioning. Yet
uncertainty in our models is quite high and parameter values that would be consistent with either
a positive or negative average eect remain plausible. is points to methodological limitations
in our use of controversial reverts as a measure of fairness. Ultimately, controversial reverts are
just too rare—especially for registered contributors with User pages—for us to be condent in our
estimates. New approaches to measuring normative and meta-normative compliance in online
communities may reect a promising area for future work.
Our work has a number of important implications for designers of algorithmic agging systems
and sociotechnical systems. Scholars of human-computer interaction, science and technology
studies, and the law, have all called for analysis of algorithmic fairness to move beyond biases
inherent in algorithms to consider the systemic and downstream eects of algorithms in use
[69, 72, 79]. We provide one answer to this call by showing one way that designers and managers
of online communities might evaluate the way that algorithmic systems may inuence community
members’ actions.
While quality control is an important function in open production communities like Wikipedia,
supporting newcomers and encouraging contribution is also essential [26, 59]. Past work has shown
that increased quality control eorts correspond to a decrease in newcomer engagement and have
hypothesized that one mechanism is increased scrutiny of newcomers [26, 73]. Similarly, while
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blocking anonymous edits led to a decrease in reverted edits, it also led to a decrease in positive
contributions [32]. While it may be intuitive to think about edits that get sanctioned as obvious
vandalism, many of the edits agged by the “maybe bad” threshold are authored by well-meaning
newcomers and anonymous editors [26]. ere’s a potentially high cost to sanctioning these low
quality but well intentioned contributions. We believe that our results point to the benet of
tracking changes in the rate of sanctions to sensitive groups of community members in order to
assure that such well-meaning contributors aren’t being driven away.
ere are also lessons to learned from the impressive degree with which RCFilters shapes behavior.
Designers should think about whether using thresholds to trigger agging in moderation interfaces
is a fair practice. While thresholds allowed us to explore the eects of agging on sanctioning
behavior, this arbitrary agging of actions applied by RCFilters brought disproportionate aention
to contributions just above the thresholds compared to contributions just below. Our results show
that this leads to sanctioning behavior that is disproportionate and, like the thresholds, arbitrary.
What types of designs might support quality control support models that scrutinize contributions
in proportion to the likelihood that the contributions deserves to be sanctioned? We see some
inspiration in Huggle, a counter-vandalism tool for Wikipedia which sorts actions by the likelihood
that they are damaging.5 Huggle users are encouraged to review the highest likelihood edits rst
and only move onto lower likelihood edits once those reviews are complete. Such a user experience
might increase eciency and fairness by beer concentrating moderator aention wherever it can
have the greatest benets.
10 CONCLUSION
As algorithmic agging becomes more integrated into online community moderation, it is important
to understand its eects and consequences on discrimination and fairness. We use a regression
discontinuity analysis of the RCFilters used to nd and sanction misbehavior by volunteers on
Wikipedia to consider how the use of algorithmic agging and social signals interact. We nd that
by drawing moderator aention to misbehavior by registered participants, algorithmic agging can
reduce over-proling. We also nd that algorithmic agging can support fairness by decreasing
controversial sanctions of unregistered contributors. On the other hand, our results suggest that
the same system may have much less eect, and might even increase discrimination, for other
types of over-proled users.
Critics of machine learning trace how algorithms can encode discriminatory paerns in human
behavior. Such questions are pertinent to the use of machine predictions in decision making in
high-stakes seings like employment, education, and criminal justice. Our work uses data from
a lower-stakes context to show that when tools for predictive governance are introduced into a
sociotechnical system, their eects may be dicult to anticipate.
While our analysis of over-proling based on registration status supports a rosy account of
algorithmic agging, our analysis of over-proling based on User pages suggests that the interaction
between algorithmic agging and social signals is more complex and contingent. Our work suggests
a need for future work that describes the kinds of social signals that are used in practice and
explains how dierent types of information may be used alongside algorithmic ags. Finally, we
present a methodological approach that we hope future studies of algorithmic tools in real-world
sociotechnical systems might build upon to establish the causal eects of algorithmic systems
without experimental interventions.
5See discussion in [28]
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